## NEW YORK COFFEE AND SUGAR EXCHANGE FUTURES

Volume of Sales (Bags)

Period "A" No. 7	"D" Santos No. 4	"H" Colom- bian	Total	
Feb., 1935 303,500		2.050	988,000	
Feb., 1934 276,250 Feb., 1933 45,500		3,250 1,750	868,750 214,000	
Feb., 1932 264,500		1,730	512,000	
Feb., 1931 350,000			891,500	
Feb., 1930 365,750			907,250	
2 mos. 1935 440,750			1,544,250	
2 mos. 1934 504,500		7,000	1,674,250	
2 mos. 1933 104,250		5,000	488,250	
2 mos. 1932 368,500			823,000	
2 mos. 1931 578,500 2 mos. 1930 1 104.75			1,593,500	
2 mos. 19301,104,75	0 1,533,250		2,648,000	
Year 19341,796,50		10,500	6,269,500	
Year 19331,601,00		62,500	5.124.750	
Year 19321,238,00		9,250	4,231,50	
Year 19313,933,25			10,252,000	
Year 19305,225,50	0 7,736,250		12,989,750	

<sup>\*</sup>Includes sales "F". (1932—1,000) (1931—21,250) (1930—22,250).

traders quickly responded and there is a general feeling that until an assured and definite policy is mapped out at Rio there is little hope of advance in coffee quotations. On February 18, following the report of the Supreme Court of the United States on gold payments, there was practically the first real rally of the month, from 12 to 19 points, continuing slightly in the following week. Otherwise, recession of quotations marked nearly every trading day of the period.

Reviewing the world coffee situation, Nortz & Co. makes the following report (February 21), containing a review of present conditions:

#### NORTZ & Co.

"Two important events have taken place during the past two weeks. One was the decision by the Brazilian Federal Government to free exchange, that is, to permit shippers to sell 65% of their export bills in the open market, delivering 35% to the Banco do Brazil, at the fixed rate—at present 11\$525 for the dollar. To better understand the merits of the case, we must remember that 85% of Brazil's exports consist of coffee, while the other 15% is made up of other produce. Exporters of this 15% had so far been free to sell their bills in their totality, in the open market, at the private rate of about 158000, the Government hoping, in this way, to stimulate the production of commodities other than coffee. The difference is that hereafter, those who export these other commodities will also have to deliver 35% of their bills to the Banco do Brazil. On the whole, it is figured that, other things being equal, the contemplated change would amount to a reduction of about 80¢ to 90¢ per 100 lbs. in the price of coffee.

### THE FIFTEEN SHILLING TAX

- "Last Thursday cables received from Rio stated that a proposal had been submitted to Congress by representatives of São Paulo to reduce the

# BRAZIL COFFEE EXPORTS

	Januar	y, 1935		
	In bags of	132 pounds		
Ports		Abroad	Coastal	Total
Santos Rio de Janeiro Victoria Paranaguá Bahia Recife Angra dos Reis		751,392 188,972 102,227 25,101 10,931 3,440 800	79 7,617 17,984 57 8,553 1,710	751,471 196,589 120,211 25,158 19,494 5,150 800
	7		24.000	

Compiled by the Departamento Nacional do Café, Rio de

special export tax of 15 shillings per bag (about 45 mitreis) to 3 shillings—a decrease of about 80%. This news was not entirely unexpected—it has been in the air, so to speak, for quite some time past. It was corroborated by steady selling on the part of Brazil.

"Due to recent rulings concerning the sale of Exchange bills, there has now been a reduction of about 60¢ on these charges. When the Spot price for coffee in New York is 8¢, two-thirds is consumed by taxes, freight and other expenses. The 15 shilling tax for coffee defense purposes, alone amounted to about 3¢ per 1b. Needless to say this would have created an almost unbearable the fact that the buying power of the milres in Itazil is still about double what it is in international markets. However, this is bound to right itself as foreign countries are insisting more and more on a reciprocal share in Brazil's business. "It is also reported that the D. N. C. is opposed

"It is also reported that the D. N. C. is opposed to the contemplated change, probably in view of the fact that it owes about 1,200,000 contos or 90 million dollars to the Banco do Brazil—noney used to pay for 34 million bags of coffee which have been destroyed. The total value of the coffee this or about \$400,000,000. Moreover, should the total tax be materially reduced, it would probably cause the downfall of the whole present Coffee Defense Scheme, based on the destruction of surpluses.

"However, new factors have recently come to the fore-one of them is that Brazilians realize more and more that they have to choose between two evils. Either they must continue to maintain prices above those asked by their competitors, thus paving the way for the latter who continue to increase their production and succeed in selling their entire crops regularly, which means that Brazil may be gradually maneuvering herself out of the supply picture; or they must try to undersell

#### COFFEE DESTRUCTION IN BRAZIL

Figures compiled by the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange

(In bags of 132 lbs.)

June, Jan. 1, Jan. 1, Total
1931 1934 1935
to
1932 1934 1935
1933 1934 1935
1933 1934 1935
1933 1934 1935
1938 1938 1938 1935

<sup>\*</sup> Not including 479,000 destroyed prior to June, 1931, by São Paulo Coffee Institute.